Contents

Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
Voting
Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

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Home > Comparisons > Droop > Cloning > Page 2 of 2
Last Revision: New on 25 Aug 2012

Comparisons: Droop Quota ~ Party Cloning 2

Comparative Susceptibility of CHPV and the Droop Quota to Party Cloning

The party cloning threshold figures for CHPV are presented in the earlier Evaluations: Party Cloning section. To enable a direct comparison between the susceptibility of CHPV and the Droop Quota to party cloning, the relevant threshold figures for up to six winners are repeated below left for the Droop Quota and below right for CHPV.

CHPV Thresholds
Droop Quota Thresholds

Where elections are held here with two or three winners (W), CHPV is not susceptible to party cloning. For four, five or six winners, CHPV is only vulnerable when party B already has the majority share of the vote. With a minority share, party B gains nothing at best but risks harming itself quite significantly.

As the Droop Quota is never vulnerable to party cloning in this election scenario, CHPV cannot better it in this respect. However, as shown in the previous section, the optimality of CHPV is comparable to that of the Droop Quota in few-winner elections. When the optimality of CHPV is around its peak value, it frequently outperforms the Droop Quota. This peak varies slightly with the number of parties competing in a CHPV election but it occurs at about four or five seats for up to nine parties.

As party-list CHPV elections are conducted concurrently across multiple few-winner constituencies, outcomes here are as likely to be optimally proportional as those where the Droop Quota approach is used instead. However, it is critical with CHPV to ensure that the number of seats per constituency is optimal for the anticipated number of parties that will contest an election. Otherwise, the Droop Quota method will doubtless produce the more proportional set of results.


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