Comparisons: Plurality Rule Methods 2

Ranked Ballot CHPV versus other Single-Winner Methods

CHPV does not seek to satisfy any Condorcet criterion as such criteria are designed to assess compliance with the majority rule interpretation of 'fairness' and CHPV is not a Condorcet or majority rule method.

Compared to iterative plurality rule (PR) methods, CHPV yields a definitive result after a single round of counting. However, in consequence, winners are not required to gain a majority of the tallies; only a plurality of them. These iterative PR methods include exhaustive and two-round plurality, alternative vote, supplementary vote, Coombs method and Bucklin voting. CHPV is an easier-to-understand and an easier-to-use method than some of the iterative PR ones.

Approval voting attempts to mediate somewhere in between plurality and anti-plurality as each voter must respectively 'approve of' at least one option and 'disapprove of' at least one other option. Different voters may therefore cast a different number of votes 'in favour'. This disparity presents a substantial opportunity for tactical voting. Also, only two preference ranks - for or against - are permitted. Approval voting is therefore not a form of preferential voting as a strict ranking of the candidates is impossible. Nor can it be analysed as a positional voting system since voters differ in the worth awarded to a given strictly-ranked preference. Using untruncated CHPV, voters strictly rank all candidates with a fixed preference weighting for each given rank position.

Range voting allows voters - instead of the voting algorithm as in CHPV - to specify the separation intervals between the values of the options. These differential scores reflect the intensity of the voter preferences for any two candidates. However, by awarding an absolute rating of support rather than just the relative rank order of support, voter decisions are made significantly more complex. Consequently, there is then considerable scope to exaggerate such differences for tactical advantage. As CHPV rank positions have fixed values, there is much less scope here for insincere voting; especially when truncation is prohibited.

Compared to sincere voting in FPTP elections, both approval and range voting are more likely to select a 'consensus' option than a 'polarized' one. So voters here who wish to promote a polarized candidate over a consensus one are the most likely to engage in tactical voting. Hence, when the strategic nomination of clones is not an issue, the Borda Count offers a better PR approach than approval or range voting where the desired outcome is the selection of a consensus candidate.

In contrast to rival direct PR methods, CHPV is the intermediate GV variant between the polarized FPTP and the consensus Borda Count systems since the quantity of CHPV preferences cast and the quality of their rank are equally important. CHPV also counterbalances the effects of vote splitting against those of teaming and tactical voting is much less likely to occur than in either approval or range voting.

Proceed to next section > Comparisons: Plurality Rule Methods 3

Return to previous page > Comparisons: Plurality Rule Methods 1