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Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
Voting
Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

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Home > Proofs > Borda Count > CB1
Last Revision: New on 25 Aug 2012

Mathematical Proofs: Borda Count

Proof CB1: Candidate Preferences and Average Rank Positions

For Borda Count elections, let the common difference between adjacent preferences be one point and the weighting of the lowest (last) preference be L points. The number of candidates is N and the number of voters is V. Also, let the number of voters awarding an nth preference (with a weighting of wn) to a candidate be xn. The following list defines the Borda Count weightings used in this election.

Where truncation does not occur, all voters award one preference to each candidate. Hence, regardless of the rank of any preference, the total number of preferences received by each candidate is equal to the total number of votes cast; as stated below.

Sum of Votes

The tally (T) for any candidate is the sum for all N preferences of the products of the number of nth preferences awarded and their weighting; as stated below. The average tally per voter (TAV) for a candidate is simply their tally divided by the total number of voters; as follows.

Average Tally per Voter

The average rank position (nAV) of a candidate is defined as the vote-weighted (x-weighted) average value of the rank position (n); as stated below.

Average Rank Position

The following derivation simplifies the sum of the average tally per voter (TAV) for a candidate and their average rank position (nAV).

Sum of both Averages

For any given election, the number of voters (V), the number of candidates (N) and the weighting of the lowest preference (L) are all fixed. The collective ranking of the candidates from first to last is determined by the descending order of the candidate tallies. Dividing all such tallies by V to produce the average tally per voter does not alter this ranking when using these averages instead of the absolute tallies to determine the results.

As N + L is a constant, this means that as TAV rises nAV falls by the same amount. So, the highest TAV and the lowest value of nAV belong to the top-ranked (winning) candidate. The next highest TAV and the next lowest value of nAV belong to the second-ranked candidate and so on. Note that the lower of two values of nAV has the higher rank. For example, an average rank position of two (second place) is higher in rank order than three (third place). Therefore, the following two statements are true for any Borda Count election where truncation does not occur.


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