Contents

Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
Voting
Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

Valid XHTML 1.0 Strict

Valid CSS

Home About Description Evaluations(RB) Evaluations(PL) Comparisons(SW) Comparisons(MW) Conclusions General Maps Proofs
Home About Description Evaluations(RB) Evaluations(PL) Comparisons(SW) Comparisons(MW) Conclusions General Maps Proofs
Home > Evaluations > Majority Criteria > Page 2 of 4
Last Revision: 25 Apr 2021

Evaluations: Majority and Related Criteria 2

Two-Thirds Majority Criterion

If CHPV is employed in an election, what proportion of first preferences must a candidate receive in order to be guaranteed victory? This proportion (m) is specified on the previous page as m ≥ 1/(2-r) where r = 1/2 for CHPV. Hence, m ≥ 2/3 for CHPV as shown in the graph on that same page. Using CHPV, any candidate acquiring more than the majority threshold of two thirds of first preferences is guaranteed to win.

CHPV therefore satisfies the two-thirds majority criterion.

CHPV meets this criterion irrespective of the number of candidates standing in the election. When only a few candidates enter the contest and voters do not truncate their ballots, this majority threshold is somewhat reduced. The required majority of first preferences (m) varies with the number of candidates (N) and the common ratio (r) used; as given below.

Majority Threshold versus Number of Candidates

For CHPV (where r = 1/2), the resultant relationship between m and N is shown in the graph opposite. For just two candidates a simple majority (m ≥ 1/2) is all that is required. With three candidates fighting the election instead, a 60% majority threshold (m ≥ 3/5) is needed.

As the number of candidates increases further, the majority threshold gets rapidly ever closer to the overall two-out-of-three (m ≥ 2/3) first preference requirement. Mathematicians call this rise an asymptotic approach.

Using CHPV in a single-winner election ensures that the candidate with the most first preferences is guaranteed to be elected if they have over two thirds of them. That is double the number any other candidate could achieve.

The leading first preference candidate is still likely to win even with less than two-thirds support unless the main challenger has broad support from voters in terms of high-ranking preferences and, apart from first preferences, the leading candidate does not.

Hence with CHPV, a powerful challenger could beat the otherwise leading candidate but only when that candidate has less than two thirds of first preferences and few other significant preferences. The figure of two thirds is an arbitrary yet popular, convenient and satisfying fraction for a majority threshold higher than one half. This very level of support is the minimal requirement for the election of a Pope.


Proceed to next page > Evaluations: Majority Criteria 3

Return to previous page > Evaluations: Majority Criteria 1