Contents

Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
Voting
Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

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Home > Comparisons > Positional Voting > Page 10 of 10
Last Revision: 10 Apr 2023

Comparisons: Positional Voting 10

Designing Systems for a Specific Bias

Only the Plurality vector has a fixed system bias irrespective of the number of candidates (N) standing. It is wholly polarized. For a vector with maximum consensus regardless of N, then the Borda Count should be employed. For a relatively large field of candidates, the analysis in proof 3 and on page 5 and page 7 highlights that the bias of a positional voting system can largely be fixed by adopting a GV(r) vector where r = CIV when N → ∞. Also, the analysis in proof 5 and on page 8 shows that last place truncation raises the CIV closer to its asymptotic value of r. The table below illustrates the scale of this shift for the CHPV vector (CIV ≈ r = 0.5). With relatively few candidates, truncation has a marked beneficial effect.

Refer to proof CV6
Consensus Index Table for Un/Truncated CHPV

For a small field of candidates, it is not possible to design a positional voting system with a fixed bias without knowing beforehand how many candidates will actually stand. However, unless N is especially small, the best option is typically to use a GV(r) vector with the requisite common ratio and the lowest rank position truncated.

To design a balanced or unbiased system for any number of competing candidates, CHPV should be chosen since its common ratio r = 1/2 and its CIV ≈ PIV; thus the bias in each opposing direction is essentially negated by the other. Truncating this vector improves adherence to its inherent lack of bias towards either consensus or polarization. However, it must be borne in mind that in so doing the other key properties of CHPV may be somewhat adversely affected. Last place truncation is more important and effective when designing a positional voting system with a bias towards consensus rather than polarization.


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