Map of the Website
Home
Description:
- Introduction - Page 1
- Analogy - Page 1
- Weightings - Page 1
- Voting - Page 1
- Counting - Page 1
- Outcomes - Page 1
- Party-List - Page 1
- Summary - Page 1
Evaluations (Ranked Ballot):
- Introduction (Ranked Ballot) - Page 1
- General Criteria - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4
- Majority Criteria - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4
- Clones & Teaming - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4 ; Page 5 ; Page 6 ; Page 7
- Teaming Thresholds - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4 ; Page 5 ; Page 6
- Summary (Ranked Ballot) - Page 1 ; Page 2
Evaluations (Party-List):
- Introduction (Party-List) - Page 1
- Diagrams & Maps - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4 ; Page 5
- CHPV Maps - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3
- Optimality - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4
- Party Cloning - Page 1 ; Page 2
- Proportionality - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4
- Summary (Party-List) - Page 1
Comparisons (Single-Winner):
- Introduction (Single-Winner) - Page 1
- Plurality (FPTP) - Page 1 ; Page 2
- Borda Count - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3
- Geometric Voting - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4 ; Page 5 ; Page 6 ; Page 7 ; Page 8 ; Page 9 ; Page 10 ; Page 11
- Positional Voting - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3 ; Page 4 ; Page 5 ; Page 6 ; Page 7 ; Page 8 ; Page 9 ; Page 10
- Condorcet Methods - Page 1 ; Page 2
- Alternative Vote (IRV) - Page 1
- Plurality Rule Methods - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3
- Summary (Single-Winner) - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3
Comparisons (Multiple-Winner):
- Introduction (Multiple-Winner) - Page 1
- Single Transferable Vote - Page 1 ; Page 2
- Party-List - Page 1 ; Page 2 ; Page 3
- Party-List ~ Hare Quota - Page 1
- Party-List ~ Droop Quota - Page 1
- Party-List ~ D'Hondt - Page 1
- Party-List ~ Sainte-Laguë - Page 1
- Mixed Member Systems - Page 1
- Summary (Multiple-Winner) - Page 1 ; Page 2
Conclusions:
General:
Map Construction:
Mathematical Proofs:
- Table of Contents
- GV (any r) fails the Condorcet Winner Criterion
- GV (any r) fails the Condorcet Loser Criterion
- GV (any r) fails the Reversal Symmetry Criterion
- Majority Threshold as a function of Common Ratio
- Majority Threshold as a function of Common Ratio and Number of Candidates
- Pairwise Majority Thresholds as a function of Common Ratio
- Effect of Strong versus Broad Support as a function of Common Ratio
- GV (any r) is not Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives
- GV Teaming Thresholds for Clone Set versus One Candidate
- GV Teaming Thresholds for Clone Set versus Two Candidates
- GV Teaming Thresholds for Clone Set versus Three Candidates
- GV Teaming Thresholds for Clone Set versus Many Candidates
- GV Teaming Effect and Success Thresholds for Clone Set versus One Candidate
- Extreme Seat Share Domain Volume Ratios for OPV Maps
- Extreme Seat Share Domain Volume Ratios for CHPV Maps
- Worst Case Resolution Least Squares Index for OPV
- Voting System Least Squares Index for CHPV
- Candidate Preferences and Average Rank Positions
- Common Ratio 'Arc' on a Three-Preference Map
- Equivalent Positional Voting Systems to Three-Candidate GV Variants
- Identifying Equivalent Three-Candidate Voting Systems
- Iso-Tally Grid Lines on Three-Candidate Maps
- Minimum Winning Rank for a Consensus Candidate
- Rank of the Preference with the Mean Weighting
- Common Ratio for Balance between Vote Splitting and Teaming
- Example of Vulnerability to Tactical Voting
- Consensus and Polarization Indices for Positional Voting Vectors
- Common Ratio for GV(r) Vectors
- Consensus and Polarization Indices for Geometric Voting
- Consensus Index Values for other Example Vectors
- Bias Indices and Truncation
- Consensus and Polarization Indices for Truncated GV(r) Vectors
- Voting System Least Squares Index for Droop Quota
- Voting System Least Squares Index for D'Hondt Method
- Notation & Formats
Return to > General: Table of Contents